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5.  
RE-IMAGINING THE NATURE OF DEVELOPMENT  
Biodiversity Conservation and Pastoral Visions in the Northern 
Areas, Pakistan  
Nosheen Ali  
Examines how, in the mountainous village of Shimshal, national parks and 
“community-based” conservation projects such as trophy hunting are deeply 
problematic, promoting exploitive ideologies of nature and development while de-
legitimizing the values and rights of pastoralists. The Shimshalis have creatively 
resisted the appropriations of their land by creating a Shimshal Nature Trust, 
implementing a model of ecological sovereignty instead of “community 
participation”—challenging the very logic of protected areas in international 
conservation.  
Introduction  
Over the last thirty years, almost 40 percent of the territory of the Northern Areas in 
Pakistan has been converted into government-owned protected areas, in the form of national 
parks, wildlife sanctuaries, game reserves, and hunting areas. Indeed, it is not unusual to 
hear that state authorities wish to transform the biodiversity-rich Northern Areas into a 
“living museum” for wildlife. This vision has been critically supported and shaped by 
international conservation NGOs, particularly the International Union for the Conservation 
of Nature (IUCN) and the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), both of which have a 
major presence in the region.  
 
In this chapter, I explore the conflicts and contestations that such a vision of conservation 
has generated in lived practice. My focus is on the trajectory of the very first experiment 
embracing this vision—the Khunjerab National Park (KNP) that was founded in 1975—as 
well as more recent community-based conservation programs of international trophy 
hunting that have become popular in Northern Pakistan. I examine two key questions: First, 
what are the ideals and ideologies that underpin the projects of biodiversity conservation in 
the Northern Areas? And second, how and why do local communities in the region—
specifically the pastoral villagers of Shimshal in the case of the KNP—critique and contest 
the practices of global conservation?  
 
I argue that national parks in Northern Pakistan as well as more recent community-based 
conservation approaches are deeply problematic, as they are contingent on relinquishing the 
very land and livelihood on which pastoral communities are founded. Such projects often 
assume that practices of local societies pose a key threat to nature, instead of 
acknowledging that nature is embedded in social relations and cannot be protected without 
recognizing indigenous values, rights, and ownership. Further, conservation projects such as 
trophy hunting have introduced a market calculus in the management of nature, by 
commodifying it for elite, mostly Western tourists. These projects are framed as initiatives 
for “sustainable development,” but in effect, they have served to entrench the power of the 
state and capital over local ecologies and communities.  
 
Faced with displacement and distress as a result of conservation projects, villagers of 
Shimshal in Northern Pakistan have responded with courage and creativity, and hitherto 
managed to protect their homes and pastures from being seized in the name of global 
conservation. They have done this by creating a Shimshal Nature Trust (SNT)—which has 
established indigenous ownership and management of Shimshali ancestral land to counter 
its appropriation by the Khunjerab National Park. A biodiversity hotspot owned and 
managed entirely by a local community has long been considered unthinkable in global 
conservation practice, which mandates that the territory be owned by state authorities and 
managed primarily by national and international conservation agencies. The villagers of 
Shimshal have hence challenged the fundamental logic of international conservation.  
 
While the Shimshalis have struggled against the KNP in order to protect their land and 
livelihood, their struggle is especially significant for it contests the epistemic exclusion of 
pastoral visions from the very definition of development. It challenges the dominant 
meanings of “nature” and “conservation” in global environmental practice, questions whose 
knowledge counts as “expertise,” and recasts the very process through which “global” 
development ideals and projects are framed and terms of “community participation” 
defined. By creating a Shimshal Nature Trust which proposes indigenous ownership of 
local land and ecology—as opposed to a national park or revenue-sharing conservation 
schemes—Shimshalis engage in what Jean Franco has called the “struggle for interpretive 
power” (1999). This involves active appropriation and new repertoires of representation 
through which marginalized communities carve a space of maneuver within dominant 
paradigms (Pratt, 1999; Cornwall, Harrison, & Whitehead, 2007). Shimshalis have to 
strategically represent and position themselves in relation to conservation, in order to claim 
voice and value, and simply to survive. Simultaneously, they puncture the epistemic 
privilege through which state and international institutions construct particular visions of 
the world as natural, and particular interests as the right, universal, and inevitable path of 
progress.  
From Natural Areas to Neo-Liberal Resources  
The idea of a “natural protected area” such as a national park for biodiversity conservation 
emerged from an ahistorical construction of nature, in which nature was viewed as a 
pristine, peopleless wilderness instead of a lived social landscape (Cronon, 1995). Inspired 
by Enlightenment and Romantic values, this imagined wilderness had to be created, 
scientifically managed, preserved, and toured—primarily by urbanites for their own use and 
luxury. Such valuations of nature emerged in the context of an ongoing unfolding of liberal 
capitalist modernity, which produced the “natural” and the “social” as separate and distinct 
realms of existence. The social alienation and environmental degradation resulting from the 
process of capitalist development was partly the reason behind the conservationist impulse 
to find and preserve “untouched” and “endangered” nature—untouched by and endangered 
from capital.  
 
The nature–society relation has undergone significant changes under recent conditions of 
neo-liberal capitalism. To begin with, nature has been transformed from a factor of 
production external to capital into a commodity that itself must be bought and sold 
according to the dictates of capital (O’Connor, 1994). In practice, this commodification of 
nature has been achieved through the institutionalization of tradable pollution permits, 
transferable fishing quotas, intellectual property rights over crop varieties, the privatization 
of public utilities, and other such market-based mechanisms for managing nature. Far from 
the claims of “efficient” and “sustainable” use, these practices in effect deepen the 
exploitation of natural resources and heighten the inequities characterizing their access. 
Countries in the Global South, and particularly their indigenous communities, which 
depend directly on natural resources, tend to lose out the most, as their rights and use values 
are delegitimized to make way for the interests and exchange values of global elites.  
 
In the specific arena of biodiversity conservation, neo-liberal values have steadily 
encroached and become dominant over the last thirty years. In the 1970s, the protected area 
model and its conception of nature as divorced from society began to come under severe 
criticism for being exclusionary and ineffective, both from within the conservation 
community as well as from rural communities whose rights were being superseded by the 
imperatives of biodiversity preservation. By the early 90s, a series of conferences such as 
the 1982 and 1992 World Congress on National Parks and Protected Areas (WCNPPA) as 
well as the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, had decisively transformed the discourse 
on biodiversity conservation against the “island mentality” (McNeely, 1993) that had 
hitherto guided the management of protected areas. The aim now was not strict 
preservation, but rather conservation combined with “sustainable development.” 
International conservation organizations such as the Conservation International, WWF, and 
IUCN subsequently set about investigating how the goals of conservation could be achieved 
while simultaneously ensuring “community participation” and “benefit-sharing.”  
 
Part of the answer that they came up with was decidedly neo-liberal: the use of protected 
areas for the promotion of market ventures such as ecotourism, trophy hunting, and 
bioprospecting, which would commodify nature to serve mostly Western consumers, but 
also give local communities a share in the resulting revenue. This commodification of 
nature is presented as “conservation,” employing the circular logic of selling nature in order 
to save it (McAfee, 1999) and saving nature in order to sell it (Breunig, 2006). It is also 
presented as a form of “community-based conservation” for “sustainable development,” 
while simultaneously perpetuating a protected area model of conservation that is 
fundamentally anti-community: protected areas mostly convert commonly owned pastoral 
and agricultural land into state-owned territory in which subsistence-based uses of nature 
such as grazing and farming are severely curtailed. Frequently, indigenous communities are 
altogether evicted from their lands to create the imagined “natural” landscape, leading to an 
alarming number of “conservation refugees” around the world (Geisler, 2003). Indeed, 
subsistence uses have become delegitimized by the very definition of “biodiversity,” which 
has come to be constructed as a national and global preserve that needs to be protected 
mostly from local “threats” such as “unsustainable grazing practices” (e.g., IUCN 1999, p. 
31). Through such logics of protected areas as well as their neo-liberal uses, global 
biodiversity conservation has opened up a new frontier for the appropriation of local space 
by capital and state, thus embodying a form of what Harvey has called “accumulation by 
dispossession” (2003).1  
 
The accomplishment of this neo-liberal conservation depends critically on the discourse of 
“sustainable development” and “community-based conservation.” This discourse has served 
to re-legitimize the protected area model, leading to a vigorous expansion of protected 
areas, particularly in the developing world. Between 1986 and 1996, there was a 60 percent 
increase in the number of natural protected areas in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin 
America (Breunig, 2006). While critiques of neo-liberalism often target the policies 
promoted by organizations such as the World Bank and IMF, those of conservation 
organizations are rarely analyzed as linked to the realization of a neo-liberal agenda. This is 
partly due to the ways in which the aim of conserving biodiversity has become naturalized 
as “common sense”—an abstract, global value to be aspired toward by everyone for the 
sake of the earth as well as for future generations. Certainly, attention to the sustainability 
of the natural world and equitable access to it is of ultimate significance, and is made 
possible precisely by a language of environmental conservation that has the potential to 
offer a powerful counter to an ecologically and socially destructive consumerism driven by 
capitalist modernity. However, what this commonsense environmental ethic has come to 
embody in actual conservation practice deserves critical study, as the latter constitutes one 
of the modes through which rural livelihoods around the globe are being superseded by free 
market ideologies.  
The Context of the Khunjerab National Park, Northern Areas  
Historically known as Gilgit-Baltistan, the region today called the Northern Areas covers a 
vast terrain of some 72,496 square kilometers at the northern borders of Pakistan, India, 
China, and Afghanistan. It encompasses some of the world’s highest mountain ranges, and 
is incredibly rich in plant and wildlife diversity, supporting several rare and endangered 
species such as the snow leopard (Uncia uncia), markhor (Capra falconeri), and Himalayan 
ibex (Capra ibex siberica). This ecologically fragile region also has a tenuous political 
status. It is claimed by both India and Pakistan as part of the disputed territory of Kashmir, 
but it is effectively ruled by Pakistan, and constitutes 86 percent of the territory of Kashmir 
under its control.  
 
In 1975, the Northern Areas Wildlife Preservation Act was passed, under which the 
Northern Areas administration could declare any area in its domain as a national park, 
wildlife reserve, or wildlife sanctuary, and alter the boundaries of such areas as deemed 
necessary. Through a government notification in the same year, the Khunjerab National 
Park was subsequently established by the then Prime Minister, Zulfi qar Ali Bhutto, as the 
first national park in the Northern Areas. The KNP covers an area of 2270 sq. km, and 
comprises the grasslands of the Khunjerab, Ghujerab, and Shimshal valleys in the upper 
Hunza region of the Northern Areas. During the time of princely and colonial rule, the 
village communities which inhabited this area enjoyed grazing rights on its pastures and 
paid livestock and livestock products as tax to the Mir, the princely ruler of Hunza. Some 
pastures like that of Shimshal had been bought from the Mir and were directly owned by the 
local agro-pastoral communities.  
 
The official rationale for the KNP was the protection of the endangered Marco Polo sheep, 
as well as the preservation of other Asian wildlife species such as the snow leopard, blue 
sheep, and Himalayan ibex. The park was recommended and delineated by the famous 
American field zoologist George B. Schaller, who was affi liated with the Wildlife 
Conservation Society and visited Pakistan several times between 1970 and 1975. It was 
designated as a Category II park; according to the guidelines provided by IUCN, this meant 
that human activity such as grazing and hunting would be banned and visitors would be 
allowed only for “inspirational, educational, cultural and recreational purposes at a level 
which will maintain the area in a natural or near natural state” (IUCN, 1994).  
 
Contesting Conservation  
While all the other villages that were going to be affected by the Khunjerab National Park 
eventually accepted its authority, the village of Shimshal still refuses to give up its land. 
This has been a major impediment in the implementation of the KNP, as two-thirds of it is 
comprised of Shimshali territory.  
 
As the map in Figure 5.1 shows, Shimshal is located at the northeastern periphery of the 
Northern Areas, along the border of Pakistan with China. It comprises about 2700 sq. km of 
high altitude land in the Central Karakoram region, and is exclusively controlled by an 
agro-pastoral community of approximately 1700 people.2 Within this area, Shimshalis 
maintain several village settlements, enough irrigated land to fulfill their food requirements, 
and over a dozen communal pastures for seasonal herding of their sizable livestock 
population.  
 
Shimshalis offer a number of reasons to explain why they have been resisting the 
conversion of their territory into a national park. To begin with, Shimshalis argue that the 
Khunjerab National Park was created without any consultation with the affected 
communities regarding its boundaries, regulations, or management. They were simply 
informed that most of their pastures and even some of their village settlements were now 
part of a state-owned national park.  
 
Beyond concerns about the arbitrary and undemocratic foundation of the KNP, the main 
apprehension of Shimshalis is the loss of their land and livelihood. The comunity 
 
 
Exhibit 5.1 The Location of Shimshal in the Northern Areas (Gilgit-Baltistan), Pakistan (Source: Butz 
1996).  
 
of Shimshal stands to lose the most from the park due to its exceptionally high dependence 
on livestock herding as a source of livelihood. In 1995, Shimshalis owned a total of 4473 
goats, 2547 sheep, 960 yaks, 399 cows, and 32 donkeys (Ali & Butz, 2003), and they 
continue to have the largest livestock holdings in the Hunza region. An enforcement of park 
regulations would entail a complete ban on grazing and hunting in most Shimshali pastures, 
so that wildlife species and their habitats can be preserved. This would directly threaten 
Shimshali livelihoods not only because of the loss of pastures, but also due to the 
prohibition on hunting certain wildlife predators of livestock. As Shimshali villagers said to 
me:  
We are supposed to protect the snow leopard, even though it eats up our goats and sheep and 
causes a huge economic loss for us. Who will compensate us for this loss? We have to pay the 
price for conservation. First our rights should be honored, then those of wildlife.  
These statements challenge the modernist, universalizing agenda of biodiversity 
conservation that privileges the protection of wildlife for the “future of the earth” over the 
protection of pastoral livelihoods and futures. For Shimshalis, conservation—as promoted 
by international conservation organizations—is not of inherent value because it entails an 
appropriation of their territory, and because one of the rare species that needs to be 
protected is a deadly predator of livestock. Yet, to prevent their displacement by the 
Khunjerab National Park, Shimshalis have themselves implemented a self-imposed ban on 
wildlife hunting. As a Shimshali shepherd commented to me:  
We believe in conservation. That’s why we imposed a ban on wildlife hunting ourselves 10 years 
ago. In other places, if a snow leopard eats up livestock, it tends to get hunted down in a 
retaliatory killing so that the helpless shepherd can recover his loss by selling the leopard’s pelt.  
Indeed, Shimshalis go beyond claims of merely fulfilling the responsibilities that modern 
conservation expects of them. They claim ownership of the very “nature” that external 
authorities wish to conserve, by pointing out their historical role in producing this nature:  
My ancestors planted the trees in Shimshal. How can someone come and tell me that these trees 
do not belong to me?  
The markhor (Capra falconeri) is alive because of us.  
Through such claims, Shimshalis challenge the dominant tendency of viewing nature as a 
self-existing, untouched entity, instead of one that is historically produced by and 
fundamentally linked to human activity and labor. These statements can also be read as 
claims to a local form of ecological nationalism, in which the right to place is asserted 
through a discourse of lived landscape, nature intimacy, and stewardship (Cederlof & 
Sivaramakrishnan, 2006).  
To support this assertion of local sovereignty based on a historically grounded, indigenous 
conservation, Shimshalis further point out the state’s incompetence in conserving nature:  
We have inhabited and tended this difficult terrain for centuries. What does the DFO3 or the 
consultant know about conservation? A while back, a park official came and told us that we need 
to sign a Memorandum of Understanding and give up the rights to our territory for the KNP so 
that wildlife habitats can be protected. I told him, “Come, I will show you the area where we 
have protected wildlife.” And he responded, “I don’t think I can trek that far.” Then I politely 
asked him, “If you cannot walk to the area, how will you ever conserve it?”  
In areas where the KNP has been implemented, hunting by state officials has become more 
common and convenient. This is why the wildlife populations have decreased in these areas. And 
now the government is putting more pressure on us to accept the park so that wildlife in our 
areas can be exploited.4  
Such statements assert a local aptitude for conservation that is presented as superior to that 
of state institutions and international organizations,
5
 and also challenge the common 
portrayal of Shimshalis as incapable stewards of nature (Butz, 1998). This is significant, as 
the discourse of the state and conservation NGOs in the Northern Areas is centered 
precisely on problematizing the lack of local “capacity” in attaining conservation goals, 
which helps to justify an international organization’s own role in creating, planning, and 
managing state-owned conservation zones. My point is not to romanticize the local 
community, and its interest and capability in conservation. Rather, I wish to point out that 
conservation agencies in the Northern Areas assume a priori that local communities lack 
credibility and experience with respect to conservation. They also do not research whether 
community practices might have a positive role in wildlife conservation in areas where 
there remain sizable numbers of rare species.  
 
The tendency to undervalue the role of local communities in sustaining nature has indeed 
been a constitutive feature of global conservation discourse. It is assumed that natives lack 
ecological values that are supposedly the preserve only of Western elites (Gareau, 2007). 
The nature–society relation in communities across continents has come to be described 
through “degradation narratives” that perpetuate the stereotype of an essentialized, 
irresponsible native—often without the support of any scientific analysis—as they help to 
justify national and international interventions for protecting the “global commons” from its 
local users (Brockington & Homewood, 2001; Neumann, 2004). These narratives emerged 
from, and build upon a long-standing colonial discourse that helped to legitimize the 
appropriation of nature for varied interests including commercial exploitation, hunting 
pleasure, and strategic needs (Rangarajan, 2006). Today, they continue to thrive in 
conservation discourse, despite the rhetoric of including and valorizing the “local 
community.”  
Representation and Power: The Case of the Shimshal Nature Trust  
Until the mid-90s, Shimshali villagers obstructed the implementation of the KNP through 








Exhibit 5.2 A Village Settlement in Central Shimshal.  
mechanisms, refusal to follow administrative regulations, and the blocking of government 
and NGO officials from entering the community (Butz, 2002). However, the pressures on 
them to submit to park authorities kept increasing, as new programs and funds for 
conservation poured into the Northern Areas in the wake of a renewed global—and 
subsequently, national—concern for biodiversity preservation. In this context, the  
confrontational stance of Shimshalis that emphasized a complete rejection of the park was 
proving to be counterproductive, and served only to reinforce the stereotype of Shimshal as 
a backward and “wild” community. Realizing this, a group of men belonging mostly to 
Shimshal’s first generation English-educated elite—and often employed in development 
NGOs based in Gilgit6 or Islamabad—began to rally community members around a politics 
of appeasement and engagement, instead of one that endorsed confrontation.7 They strongly 
felt—and feared—that a small, marginal border community like Shimshal could eventually 
suffer massive state action unless it was able to counter its negative image, and negotiate 
cordially with conservation organizations. As one of them said to me, they had to “fight 
with dialogue.” After much deliberation, they came up with an answer: a community-based 
organization called the Shimshal Nature Trust (SNT) that would manage and showcase 
Shimshal’s conservation efforts, and represent the community in dealings with external 
organizations.  
Created in 1997, the key purpose of the SNT was to formally articulate, and give material 
force to the representational claims discussed in the previous section—claims to livelihood 
dependency, native authenticity and ownership, environmental responsibility, and a place-
based conservation capability. As the “Fifteen Year Vision and Management Plan” of the 
SNT explains:  
Our largest challenge is not to develop a system of utilizing the natural surroundings sustainably, 
but rather to express our indigenous stewardship practices in language that will garner the 
financial, technical and political support of the international community, and that will persuade 
Pakistani authorities that we are indeed capable of protecting our own natural surroundings 
(SNT, 1999).  
The SNT “management plan” is precisely a response to this representational challenge: how 
to counter the language, and hence, the power of a global conservation discourse that 
refuses to acknowledge indigenous values and rights? The plan describes the socio-
economic context of the Shimshali community, the ways in which a conservation ethic has 
been historically practiced, and the community-initiated programs through which natural 
resource management is envisioned in the future.8 Following the tropes of developmentalist 
writing, these programs are divided up into implementation phases, with various activities 
planned for each phase. The SNT management plan has been distributed to all the major 
government and non-governmental organizations working on conservation and 
development in the Northern Areas, and is also accessible through the Internet. Between 
1999 and 2002, SNT members also conducted a series of “workshops” in Gilgit with 
different “stakeholders” to create awareness and legitimacy for their approach toward 
conservation.  
 
The very language, format, and content of SNT practices reflect how communities have 
come to understand and reconfigure the nature of the power exercised by international 
conservation organizations. The global discourse of “community-based nature 
conservation” and “sustainable development” is appropriated by positing Shimshalis as the 
original and most suitable conservationists, who are equipped to ensure the sustainable 
future that international conservation NGOs are striving toward.9 Moreover, the 
“participatory” approach adopted by NGOs in recent years—in part a response to the failure 
of and resistance to earlier development projects—is reconstituted to argue that effective 
participation must entail complete ownership. As the management plan explains:  
While we appreciate recent efforts by external agencies to develop [a] community-based nature 
conservation project…it is not enough that external initiatives be managed locally; rather, a 
culturally and contextually-sensitive nature stewardship programme should be developed and 
initiated, as well as managed, from within the community (SNT, 1997).  
The existence and legitimacy of such a community-centered program is then established by 
describing how indigenous ways of environmental management have historically been 
based on ecologically sound practices such as land use zoning, as well as on culturally 
specific values such as the “Islamic religious ethic of nature stewardship” in which nature is 
respected as “God’s ultimate creation” (SNT, 1997). The emphasis on such a moral ecology 
grounded in religion has an important discursive effect—it provides a way to unsettle the 
scientific authority of international conservation agencies by highlighting how the 
interpretation of nature and its conservation through ethical values is more locally 
appropriate and signifi cant than one based on scientific principles.10 However, this is not to 
suggest that religious and cultural practice does not have any real role in local systems of 
nature conservation. On the contrary, long-standing religious and cultural institutions have 
enabled Shimshalis—who follow the Ismaili sect of Islam—to collectively organize for 
conservation efforts ranging from hunting control to pasture management. The SNT itself is 
managed partly by local volunteer corps and boy scouts, who are affiliated with the jamat 
khana (religious center) in Ismaili-Muslim practice.  
 
While the key purpose of SNT is a strategic celebration and vindication of an indigenous, 
ecological sovereignty, the role of external support is also valued. Indeed, as SNT members 
emphasize, foreign scholars from universities in Japan, Canada, and the United States have 
played a critical role in shaping local consciousness and enabling community initiatives.11 
The SNT also acknowledges that for activities such as a wildlife census and wildlife 
monitoring, the support of organizations like the WWF and IUCN is especially needed and 
welcomed.  
 
Unfortunately, such collaborations have rarely materialized, as international conservation 
organizations continue to insist that any project of conservation in Shimshal must be linked 
to the conversion of community-owned land into the KNP. Even if it is now occasionally 
acknowledged—as the new rhetoric of respecting the “community” demands—that 
Shimshalis have responsibly taken care of the environment, it is argued matter-of-factly that 
their main livelihood practice of livestock grazing poses a fundamental threat to wildlife 
survival, and hence they cannot be trusted with the task of conservation.  
Reorienting Livelihoods  
The ban on livestock grazing in the Khunjerab National Park was marginally enforced until 
1989, when the newly formed government organization—the National Council for 
Conservation of Wildlife (NCCW)—drafted a plan for a stricter enforcement of the 
Category II criteria. Th e affected villages nevertheless continued to practice their 
customary grazing rights, particularly since the government was not forthcoming with the 
promised compensation. Things came to a head in 1991, when the government used the 
paramilitary Khunjerab Security Force to evict herdsmen from the park’s no-grazing zone 
and even killed some of their livestock. Eventually, in 1992, all the aggrieved communities 
except Shimshal signed an agreement with the KNP authorities that allowed them some 
concessions on their grazing rights as well a share in park-generated revenue in return for 
accepting the authority of the park (Knudsen, 1999).  
While the ban on livestock grazing was somewhat relaxed, it soon gave way to a new 
emphasis on a reduction in livestock holdings. This reduction has in effect become a pre-
condition for obtaining the community share in park-generated revenue such as entry fees. 
In fact, as a state wildlife official informed me, the very point of sharing the park revenue 
with the community is to enable them to engage in “conservation activities such as the 
reduction of their livestock over a period of time.”  
 
In recent years, this new logic of equating community conservation with livestock reduction 
has meant that park officials have withheld payment of the community share in KNP’s entry 
fees for long periods on the grounds that the concerned communities are not reducing their 
livestock holdings.12 Despite strong evidence of decreasing livestock ownership and grazing 
in the Northern Areas (Kreutzmann, 2006), KNP offi  cials continue to claim otherwise.  
Such a claim about livestock holdings has thus become a tool in the hands of KNP officials 
to retain their hold over communities and their resources.  
 
Conservation NGOs, on the other hand, concede that dependence on livestock herding is 
indeed decreasing in areas affecting the KNP. This, however, does not necessarily bring any 
credit for the community. As a manager at an international conservation NGO remarked:  
Communities are not reducing their livestock because they care about conservation. It is 
happening itself because people are increasingly seeking off-farm employment. It is only when 
they will consciously reduce livestock that we will achieve true community participation.  
In other words, it is not just particular conservation outcomes that are desired; rather, a 
disciplining of community attitudes is being struggled for, and represented as the legitimate 
form of participation. Community participation is thus reconfigured as a measure of how 
well people in the Northern Areas have internalized the international conservation 
discourse, and sacrificed their own livelihoods for its sake.  
 
Because it is believed that communities are not “participating” well, international 
conservation organizations have sought to go beyond the process of awareness-raising 
regarding the negative impact of livestock on wildlife conservation. They wish to actively 
steer people away from livestock herding by providing alternate sources of income (WWF, 
1996). These alternate livelihoods must ideally be linked to the implementation of the park, 
so that people can realize that conservation can be a source of their “development” as 
opposed to pastoralism. Linking the global project of conservation to “income-generating 
opportunities” at the local level has become known as “community-based conservation” in 
the discourse of international conservation NGOs operating in the Northern Areas, and it is 
to its contested operations that I now turn my attention.  
 
Community-Based Conservation  
For international conservation NGOs in the Northern Areas, community-based conservation 
has become synonymous with projects of ecotourism and the international sport of trophy 
hunting. The latter has particularly come to dominate the conservation scene in the Northern 
Areas over the last ten years, during which twenty-two “Community Controlled Hunting 
Areas” (CCHAs) have been created in the region. These have been established primarily by 
IUCN, through the GEF/UNDP funded Mountain Areas Conservancy Project (MACP). The 
CCHAs have a strong appeal for communities, as 75 percent of the revenue generated 
through trophy hunting goes to the community that manages the relevant area.13 
Communities also earn income through the porters and guides that accompany the hunter. 
Moreover, hunters are also known to be generous, and might give up to $3000 as a donation 
for local development after a successful hunt.  
 
International conservation organizations in the Northern Areas promote trophy hunting as a 
form of “sustainable community development” because of the cash it generates, which is 
either distributed evenly to all the households in a village, or saved with a recognized 
community-based organization that can utilize the funds for local development projects. It 
is also represented as a useful tool for conservation: the income that can be generated by 
occasionally catering to the needs of rich Pakistani and foreign hunters is deemed to be a 
significant disincentive for rampant local hunting which might be undertaken for 
subsistence, cultural significance, pleasure, or trade.  
 
Conservation agencies perceive no contradiction between projects such as the KNP that 
seek to preserve landscapes in their “natural state” for the protection of wildlife, and 
projects such as the CCHAs that turn this wildlife into a commodity that can be killed for 
pleasure. In many cases, a CCHA is in fact located right along the boundaries of a national 
park, in what is called the “buffer zone.” It is assumed that the hunting of treasured wildlife 
in these buffer zones does not disrupt their natural habitats, but the practice of livestock 
grazing and local hunting does. In effect, local use values of nature are delegitimized in 
order to secure its global exchange value.  
 
This commodification of nature in the name of conservation is perfectly aligned with the 
interests of hunters. As trophy hunting faces increased resistance in North America and 
Europe, “hunters, like multinational industries, flee to grounds where they can escape those 
restrictive conditions” (MacDonald, 2005, p. 266). The continuation of their sport, however, 
is dependent on the protection of wildlife in these freer areas from local use and abuse. This 
link between local conservation and global hunting is captured tellingly in a Safari Club 
International (SFI) sticker which I saw at the head office of a prominent international 
conservation organization in the Northern Areas. It read: “Conserve Now, Hunt Later.” No 
wonder that conservation agencies perceive no contradiction between saving nature and 
selling it: they want nature to be saved precisely so that it can be sold.  
 
Community-based trophy hunting also serves the interests of the state, and particularly of 
the local forest bureaucracy that oversees the management of protected areas. It provides an 
important source of revenue, and also reinforces the power of the state to distribute 
patronage through the granting of hunting quotas to particular communities. This serves as 
an indirect means for regulating community behavior. Indeed, the KNP management has 
used trophy hunting as a lure to put pressure on Shimshalis for giving ownership of their 
land to the KNP. As a KNP official explained:  
In 2006, we gave a permit to an American hunter to hunt in Shimshal. The community got its 
due share for the trophy as well. We then allowed the creation of a Community Controlled 
Hunting Area as an additional incentive. Since then, we have given more permits, but we will 
not release the money till Shimshalis sign an MoU in which they accept the KNP and its 
regulations. We have to bring these communities in line. They think they can extract the benefits 
of the park, without obeying the writ of the government.  
Hence, community-based conservation schemes that provide a community share in trophy 
hunting and in park entry fees, have come to perpetuate a state–community relation in 
which the very terms of participation are based on exclusion and dispossession, as they 
require communities to surrender ownership of their land on the one hand and abandon their 
livelihoods on the other. These projects have become forms of political and social control 
that help to entrench the power of the state over rural spaces and communities. This control 
is often asserted through sinister tactics. For example, in 2006, the Directorate of the 
Khunjerab National Park lodged a court case against a number of Shimshali youth for 
assaulting park rangers who had been sent to Shimshal. Members of the SNT, however, 
contend that there was only a verbal argument between the rangers and local youth, and that 
the case has been filed only to malign Shimshalis and further coerce them into accepting the 
authority of the KNP.  
 
Analyses of community-based conservation initiatives elsewhere have likewise 
demonstrated how environmental agendas framed in participatory terms have served to 
intensify state power, often diminishing the political and economic security of rural 
communities instead of enhancing it (Neumann, 2001; Agrawal, 2001a; Li, 2002; Breunig, 
2006). These agendas are defined by a dense network of national and transnational actors 
that cut across the traditional divides of state, non-governmental organization, and 
corporation (Igoe & Brockington, 2007). What is truly baffling and dangerous about the 
global conservation agenda is its insistence on promoting activities such as tourism and 
trophy hunting—which commodify nature primarily for the leisure of rich, Western 
consumers—as sustainable alternatives to local subsistence-based livelihoods. In this neo-
liberal logic, the “sustainable development” of a community becomes equated with the 
ability to raise cash incomes through the market, and the development of “nature” is 
presumed to be achieved by turning it into a commodity that is subject to market forces of 
production and exchange. Such logics cannot be implemented without the necessary 
cultivation and appropriation of local subjectivities. Through promises of “benefit-sharing,” 
already marginal, local communities are first expected to compromise their own livelihood 
concerns and take on the burden of conserving “nature,” and then led to treat nature as a 
resource from which they can and must profit from.  
 
The appeal and importance of such market-driven approaches to nature management for 
local communities should not be underestimated. In a context where the state is pushing for 
park development but shows very little interest in social development, communities like 
Shimshal tremendously value the revenue that they may get from projects like trophy 
hunting, as it can be directed for self-help initiatives ranging from water channels to health 
care provision. What they find problematic, however, is the contingency of “community-
based conservation” schemes on relinquishing the very land and livelihood on which 
communities are founded.  
 
The discourse of “alternative livelihoods” is also problematic because it assumes that a 
pastoral community’s relationship with nature is merely about economic need, and hence 
alternative sources of incomes would, and should automatically translate into a reduced 
dependence on nature—ideally, a total surrender of it so that it becomes a “protected area” 
for state and capital. What is erased in such a discourse is the central role of nature and 
pastoral activity in defining a community’s identity and its forms of belonging. In Shimshal, 
for example, pastures are considered key sites for historical events, spiritual renewal, and 
cultural celebrations (Butz, 1996). They are also particularly cherished by Shimshali 
women as places that provide respite from the constraints and anxieties of village life, by 
offering a meaningful experience of independence, female solidarity, and peace. Hence, 
what is considered a “natural” terrain of pristine wildlife is of tremendous material and 
symbolic value for Shimshalis (Moore, 1993), encompassing identity, history, and 
livelihood. Utlimately, it is the very source and meaning of life, which is why both its 
commodification and compensation is considered unthinkable.  
Conclusion  
Ten years after the establishment of the Shimshal Nature Trust, a number of SNT members 
expressed to me a sense of disillusionment about their initiative. As one of them 
commented:  
We created the SNT to engage with outside interests, and make them understand our concerns. 
Instead, we have become perceived as more of a threat, and portrayed as anti-state. This is 
completely false. We are eager to work with the state, and with international NGOs. We know 
that conservation is important. All we are saying is, don’t make a park that will prevent us from 
owning our lands and living our lives.  
 
These were the last impressions with which I left Shimshal in June 2007. By March 2008, 
however, the tide had changed. Shimshalis had managed to sign a Memorandum of 
Understanding with the Northern Areas Wildlife and Parks Department, which clearly 
acknowledged and guaranteed the land use rights and settlements of Shimshal, in return for 
cooperation in transnational and national conservation eff orts—something Shimshalis were 
always prepared to do, but on their own terms. Subsequently, the Khunjerab National Park 
authorities have also withdrawn their criminal charges against Shimshali youth. Shimshal 
Nature Trust members now speak with a sense of relief and hope, instead of frustration and 
fear. It can thus be argued that the epistemic “struggle for interpretive power” (Franco, 
1989)—which Shimshalis engaged in through the Shimshal Nature Trust—was ultimately 
successful, though the future course of interactions between Shimshal, state actors, and 
international institutions remains to be seen.  
 
The case of Shimshal embodies a critical struggle for social and ecological justice, 
contributing to peasant struggles elsewhere that have sought to reclaim rural agency in 
global development projects (McMichael, 2006). Such struggles create an opening for 
alternate visions of being and becoming. Indeed, Shimshalis hope to change the dominant 
“global” discourse on conservation itself, by arguing that they themselves are central 
makers of the development project instead of its beneficiaries, and that they are eager to 
imagine new social futures with “government participation” and “international 
participation.” This challenges the existing framework whereby epistemic and material 
powers are concentrated in the hands of a transnational–national nexus of institutions, the 
agendas of which are scripted from above while allowing “community participation.” In 
effect, like indigenous communities elsewhere, Shimshalis are working toward an 
ecological sovereignty in which their community governs itself and sustainably tends the 
resources on which it depends—as it has always done.  
 
Despite the Shimshali achievement, however, the normative narrative of biodiversity 
conservation remains wedded to projects that act in the name of community, but are 
unwilling to listen to it. Indeed, what I have tried to point out in this chapter is not only the 
unwillingness, but the structural inability of the global conservation nexus to understand 
and value the interests of local communities. Embedded in the global discourse of 
biodiversity conservation and sustainable development are assumptions— for example, 
about nature as divorced from society, and livestock as an irredeemable threat to wildlife—
and interests such as those of conservation organizations, their corporate financiers, and 
hunters, which make it unthinkable to acknowledge that a local community can own and 
manage a protected area. What gets authorized, instead, is the commodification of nature 
which  
abstracts nature from its spatial and social contexts…reinforces the claims of global elites to the 
greatest share of the earth’s biomass and all it contains…and speeds the extension of market 
relations into diverse and complex eco-social systems, with material and cultural outcomes that 
do more to diminish than to conserve diversity and sustainability (McAfee, 1999, pp. 1–3).  
 
This process of commodification has simultaneously enhanced the power of the state to 
territorialize nature and to regulate subjects through the control of nature. The end result of 
this process is that almost 40 percent of the Northern Areas’ territory has been declared as 
some form of conservation enclosure, benefiting state and capital at the cost of local 
sovereignty and livelihood.   
 
To be sure, my critique of community-based conservation is not aimed at dismissing the 
participatory turn in global development and biodiversity conservation. This turn is surely a 
necessary corrective to earlier approaches which were characterized by a top-down 
imposition of agendas and frequent use of violence. Indeed, it is precisely the rhetoric of 
“participation” and “community empowerment” that enables negotiation on the part of 
Shimshalis. At the same time, however, we need to recognize the ways in which such 
rhetoric facilitates and conceals the manipulation, violence, and displacement that is still 
widespread in conservation practice.  
 
I also do not wish to suggest that the role of conservation organizations in the Northern 
Areas has been entirely negative. Both the WWF and IUCN are staffed with several local 
managers who are all too aware of the dilemmas that conservation poses for their region 
and people, and have pushed their supervisors to be more sensitive to local contexts. These 
organizations have also undertaken important initiatives that address local needs of 
conservation, such as training of communities in restoring pastures, in protecting livestock 
from predators, and in addressing concerns of deforestation and overhunting. Importantly, 
they have also attempted to go beyond the draft ing of management plans for protected 
areas, to undertaking valuable research on topics such as local understandings of ecology 
and wildlife management.  
 
Initiatives such as these have the potential to promote a more meaningful attention to the 
“local” in conservation practice. For example, a report by IUCN (2003) examines 
customary and statutory regimes of resource control in the Northern Areas, arguing that the 
former favors conservation and sustainability whereas the latter promotes exploitation. It 
further explores how communities in the Northern Areas have had a varying historical 
experience of nature–society relations, and how differently situated actors within 
communities offer diverse explanations for declining wildlife populations. People point out 
that road construction, urbanization, and less rainfall due to climate change have been key 
threats to wildlife survival in their regions. While acknowledging that local hunting has 
been a threat, they also highlight how it has increased only in the last two decades due to 
the availability of modern weapons as well as the pressures of new market-generated 
economic needs.  
 
Importantly, not one person in this comprehensive study argues that livestock is a threat to 
wildlife. This reinforces the findings of my own fieldwork in Shimshal, which revealed how 
people perceive wildlife and livestock populations as part of a complex ecological process 
in which a complementary relationship between plant, animal, and human life has been 
historically developed and maintained by local communities. From their perspective, they 
have been conserving all along and cannot understand why they must discontinue their 
practices for the sake of conservation. A shepherd from southern France has poignantly 
echoed this sentiment: “shepherds…are trapped between the desire to do what they know 
and want to do and the requirement to act as a manager of space and biodiversity. The most 
difficult thing is perhaps to explain that, all told, this is one and the same approach” 
(Grellier, 2006, p. 163).  
 
Such reflections on biodiversity invite and enable a deeper analysis of environmental issues 
than that permitted by the dominant conservation discourse that pits local irresponsibility 
against global concerns. One hopes that for the cause of environmental sustainability as 
well as of social justice, such local understandings, values, and aspirations are not only 
researched, but actually allowed a central place in framing the agenda of biodiversity 
conservation as well as in shaping the future of development.  
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1 However, it entails the nationalization of community land instead of its privatization as Harvey 
posits.  
2 “Exclusive” in the sense that only villagers of Shimshal own and manage this vast terrain. The 
administrative role of the local or the national state has historically been limited, largely due to the rugged, 
inaccessible terrain of Shimshal. Shimshalis used to pay grazing taxes during the Mir’s reign, but after the 
abolition of the Hunza princely state in 1974, no income taxes have been paid to the Pakistan government.  
3 Abbreviation for the District Forest Officer, the key government official responsible for 
implementing state policies of conservation in the Northern Areas. 
4 The occurrence of illegal hunting by state officials in the KNP has even been acknowledged by 
the WWF, which is the main international organization that has been pushing for the formalization of the 
park (WWF, 1996). Moreover, a higher-up official at WWF also acknowledged to me in a personal 
interview that “wildlife in Shimshal is most likely being conserved well.”  
5 Research elsewhere in South Asia has also demonstrated that replacing local forms of control 
with state control is not always productive for conserving nature, because the state is generally unable to 
enforce its own conservation policies (Guha, 1989, Saberwal, 1999, Agrawal, 2001b).  
6 A town of around 50,000 people that serves as the administrative center of the Northern Areas. 
7 Their intervention was openly vilified at first, particularly by some notable village elders who 
accused them of being bought by the state and conservation NGOs. 
8 These programs include a community-enforced ban on wildlife hunting which was discussed 
earlier in this article. Keeping local needs in mind, the ban does not apply to the small number of ibex that 
are hunted for meat by yak herders in the winter.  
9 Indeed, due to the unequal power relations embedded in global conservation regimes, indigenous 
communities around the world have had to re-present themselves as environmentally responsible subjects 
to ensure their survival (Martinez-Alier, 2002). This suggests that a claim to traditional property rights and 
livelihood dependency has increasingly become insuffi  cient for preventing the appropriation of their 
rights.  
10 At the same time, a scientific approach is also drawn upon by asserting that nature conservation 
by the Shimshal community would be based, in the first place, on up-to-date statistical information 
collected by local youth. 
11  The SNT management plan itself was compiled and edited by David Butz, a geographer who has 
been working in Shimshal since 1988. 
12 These communities do not include Shimshal; they belong to the seven Upper Hunza villages that 
accepted the authority of the park, and are hence, entitled to a share in park revenue. 
13 The cost of a hunting permit varies with different wildlife species: for an ibex it is $3000, for a 
blue sheep it is $6500, and shooting an Astore Markhor can cost up to $40,000.  
 
